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In service of an analysis of Lincoln’s Cooper Union Address, Kauffeld and Innocenti offer an
account of the speech act of exhorting. Exhorting, they say, occurs in situations marked by
conflicted principles, and an appeal to high-mindedness is a defining feature of the speech act. I
wish to offer a small amendment that would extend the analysis to some objects of study that are
far less admirable that Lincoln’s Cooper Union Address.
The amendment is a more generalized notion of exhorting. Exhortation does seem to
occur only where some sort of conflictedness is expected, but the conflictedness may be of
varied kinds, just some of which involve a clash between two principles. Exhortations may have
a very wide range of content, including content that appeals not to people’s highest principles but
to their basest motives. We can exhort one another to behave in a high-minded way, but we can
also exhort one another to behave in an expedient way, and we can even exhort one another to
behave in small and mean ways. We exhort one another to pursue self-interest, to exclude people
different from ourselves, and to take risks that no rational calculation would support.
Often, but not always, exhortation involves some form of strong emotional appeal,
whether positive (such as reverence) or negative (such as fear or greed). But emotional appeal is
not a constitutive feature of exhorting; rather, emotional appeal is content that can make an
exhortation more or less effective in achieving its goal. We can exhort one another without
stirring the emotions at all, and of course exhorting, like any other speech act, can succeed in
conveying meaning without achieving the speaker’s purpose.
Exhorting is like requesting, suggesting, and commanding in predicating a future act by
the addressee and expressing the speaker’s intention to influence the addressee’s performance of
that act. Exhorting differs from these closely related speech acts in the amount of pressure
exerted on the addressee, in the source of that pressure, and in the burdens of proof a speaker
incurs with each act. An exhortation is a high-pressure speech act, but one where the pressure
does not originate in the speaker’s authority over the addressee, and where the speaker takes on a
rather serious burden of proof.
The idea that speech acts can be differentiated by looking at contrasts on features like
these is not new (Hancher, 1979). Searle and Vanderveken (1985) suggest that illocutionary
forces are made up of combinations of “components” like “the mode of achievement of the
illocutionary point” (p. 40) and “the degree of strength of the illocutionary point” (p. 41). Any
natural language may or may not contain a verb that refers to a particular combination of
attributes. Searle and Vanderveken (1985) do not give explicit attention to exhorting, but they
closely examine directing, requesting, asking, urging, telling, requiring, demanding,
commanding, ordering, forbidding, prohibiting, enjoining, permitting, suggesting, insisting,
warning, advising, recommending, begging, supplicating, entreating, beseeching, imploring, and
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praying. Of these, urging is most like exhorting: it has “a greater degree of strength” than
requesting, but “neither the authority nor the power” of commanding. And it has a special
preparatory condition “that the speaker has reasons for the course of action urged” (Searle &
Vanderveken, p. 200), creating a specific burden of proof similar to those analyzed by Kauffeld
(1998) for accusing and proposing.
As I read Kauffeld and Innocenti, they would distinguish exhorting from a speech act like
urging on the basis of what kind of reason the speaker gives for the action. To count as an
exhortation, the reason must be “high-minded.” The amendment I propose is that the reason
given must have to do with the addressee’s conflictedness, whether that conflictedness is over
principles, over desires, over fears, or over strictly practical concerns. The reason must indicate
which of the conflicting impulses should prevail—so the highest principle when principles are in
conflict, or the most prudent decision when goals are in conflict.
In a way, this is about the meaning of the English verb “exhort.” I don’t think highmindedness is part of its meaning. But the reason I choose this as the focus on my commentary is
that exhortation is such a prominent fixture in contemporary public discourse that we really do
need to think about it and try to understand how it works. An obvious place to devote critical
attention is to serial exhortationist Donald Trump. He exhorts people often, and is so
characterized in the press, but the conflictedness he addresses typically has nothing to do with
principle. For example, he famously exhorted his Iowa supporters to go to the caucuses even if
they didn’t feel like it, even if they were sick, even if they had just suffered losses or setbacks.
Exhortation appears with great regularity in the vaccination controversy, which is the
subject of my own current work. Parents who refuse to vaccinate their children are increasingly
exhorted by editorialists. But anti-vaccination activist groups also engage in exhortation, not only
exhorting their own members to “think for themselves,” but also exhorting the medical science
research community to behave more like scientists. For example, in these remarks at an Institute
of Medicine workshop on Autism and the Environment, activist Mark Blaxill (in Institute of
Medicine, pp. 273-274) exhorts the scientists present to fulfill a burden of proof that is required
of them as scientists. He is talking about the argument that a recent increase in cases of autism is
an artifact of changed diagnostic standards; when he says “we” should do actions, he means the
scientific community, of which he himself is not a member.
I want to talk a little bit about the burden of proof on time trends. I would make
the suggestion that given the increases that we have seen, the notion that the
reported increases are an artifact is a hypothesis, and it is a testable hypothesis.
I’ll just take California as an example, because there is a pretty good surveillance
system there, better than other parts of the country. A child born in California in
the early 1980s had less than a 5 in 10,000 chance of becoming autistic. By the
late 1990s, that rate was closer to 40 for 10,000, so that is roughly a 10-fold
increase in about 15 years.
The notion of that increase being artifactual has been tested in a lot of natural
experiments. There is a hypothesis of diagnostic substitution that has been tested
and falsified. There is the hypothesis of diagnostic expansion, that somehow we
are changing the quality of the diagnoses. . . .
Then I would ask the question in terms of studies, I think we should pursue
studies to clarify uncertainties, but I would urge us to consider changing the
burden of proof. Rather than saying the burden of proof is to demonstrate that all
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this is real, I would say the burden of proof is to demonstrate that it is artifactual.
(Institute of Medicine, pp. 273-274)
What’s interesting about exhortation, to me, is the way it demands either compliance or
defense—unlike suggestions, which can simply be rejected, and requests, which can simply be
refused. The forcefulness of exhortations needs more analysis. A promising target for theorizing
is the kind of conflictedness that leads a speaker to exhort instead of simply to propose. I won’t
attempt any theoretical analysis here, but just point to relevant variation in a few convenient
examples.
The Cooper Union Address is complicated, because Lincoln had a live audience present,
and a larger audience not present. He may have been exhorting each of these audiences assuming
a different conflictedness for each. I am assuming that at Cooper Union the conflict Lincoln
expected his live audience to feel was between a desire to see an end to slavery and a fear that
actively opposing slavery would lead to disunion. I don’t like to ignore the long section of the
speech aimed at Stephen Douglas, but it really does not seem to me to be part of, or preparation
for, the exhortation to the live audience. The key passages of the exhortation, at least as I read it,
are those that explicitly argue that Republicans should not allow the fear of disunion to keep
them from voicing their conviction that slavery is wrong.
In the vaccination controversy, one form of conflictedness that activists like Mark Blaxill
attribute to scientists is between a pursuit of truth and a pursuit of means to gain public
compliance. No doubt we could find many contemporary cases of exhortation that picture the
addressees as wavering between humanitarian impulses and selfish ones. In Trump’s exhortation
to Iowa supporters, the conflictedness attributed to the audience is between two rather puny
impulses: a desire to stay home tending to one’s own needs versus a desire to help Trump win
the Iowa caucus.
A very important point to notice, and it will be my last point, is that the conflictedness at
the heart of both Kauffeld and Innocenti’s account, and of mine, is a conflict that the speaker
assumes to exist in the thoughts or feelings or goals of the addressee. When a speaker exhorts an
addressee to put aside one set of their own considerations in favor of another set of their own
considerations, the speaker has not only attributed both sets of considerations to the addressee,
but has also implied that these are the only considerations relevant to the action. These
attributions are part of the disagreement space around an exhortation, and we should expect to
find that they are often the basis for objections. Anything a speaker attributes to an addressee is
rhetorically risky—and we can learn both from those who get it right and from those who get it
very wrong.
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